Propaganda by Law, Alex
Propaganda 
Alex Law 
This is the accepted version of the article, © 2016 Association 
for Media Education in Scotland (AMES), registered Scottish 
charity SC029408 
Published in Media Education Journal 60, December 2016. 
http://ames.scot/mej.html
Law, A. 2016. Propaganda. Media Education Journal. 60: 
pp.55-57.
Propaganda 
 
Alex Law 
Abertay University 
 
The symbolic power of the state centrally depends on managing the relationship between 
media and politics.1 At the centre of this process is the operation of propaganda. Propaganda 
aims to shift public perceptions of or obscure the relations of ruling. Despite popular 
conspiracy theories, this is far from a seamless process. In her path-breaking study, 
Propaganda and Counter-Terrorism rather than focus on media texts Emma Louise Briant 
forensically analyses the ‘messy’ informal processes of interstate and intrastate dynamics, 
primarily anglo-American, of propaganda as a sociological process.  
In order to reconstruct the elite narrative of the ‘war on terror’ Briant managed to access 
difficult to reach social agents adept at staying out of the limelight. A broad range of 
normally obscure informants were interviewed or communicated with, including public 
relations professionals, journalists, foreign policy, military and intelligence officials.  
By focussing on sociological processes, Briant explodes myths about propaganda as a 
smoothly-oiled machine that functions through carefully calibrated ends-means deliberations. 
Instead, propaganda is socially shaped by informal as well as formal relations of individuals 
and institutions. As the propaganda apparatus mushroomed with the ‘war on terror’ the 
coordination and integration of diverse organisational bureaucracies and cultures was beset 
by informal rivalries and institutional positioning. This was especially apparent for the 
lumbering US apparatus compared to the smaller, better integrated and more nimble UK’s 
‘Strategic Communication’, though even here rival interests struggle with each other to 
protect their independence, from the Cabinet Office, diplomats, MI6, Ministry of Defence, 
Foreign Office, Home Office, through to ‘embedded’ news journalists.  
In the US, communication tended to be contained behind the organisational walls of 
individual governmental agencies, what Briant calls ‘stovepipes’, preventing effective 
coordination across the propaganda apparatus. Different national, military and institutional 
cultures prevail, with British initiative, cynicism and worldliness contrasted to American self-
belief, rigidity and optimism. Rumsfeld dominated a Pentagon described by one insider as ‘a 
rat’s nest of military-industrial factions, factions within factions, and ever shifting alliances’. 
Rumsfeld and Cheney set the tone for institutional intimidation, distrust and coercion, 
encouraging institutional strategies of self-protection and individual initiative. In the end, the 
military undermined Rumsfeld’s authority by operating beyond his reach by opening-up 
inter-personal channels of informal communication and coordination.  
 
A strained relationship 
With its military, colonial and economic advantages eroded post-war Britain exerted relative 
power through the value placed by the US state on an intelligence apparatus honed through 
long experience of ‘counter-terrorism’. Cooperation for intelligence and propaganda purposes 
was deepened during the Cold War, even when the two states appeared to have a conflict of 
interest, for example over Suez or nuclear weapons. After the Cold War it became more 
difficult to identify a distinct enemy against which the US/UK ‘special relationship’ could be 
cemented.  
Briant reveals how the ‘special relationship’ could become a strained relationship. In a short 
chapter on Iraq, media planning in the theatre was bedevilled by Republican ideologues 
whose main narrative aimed to appease a US audience rather than attend to the violence faced 
by the long-suffering Iraqi people. British efforts to establish a post-invasion Iraqi media 
network was frustrated by rigid American control. Little understanding was shown by the 
propagandists of local cultures, an attitude mocked by one field operative: ‘If you don’t 
understand I’m gonna talk to you louder in English’. As Briant argues, psychological 
profiling was less about engaging with audiences than it was a more effective means to 
dominate and legitimate.  
Political and military propaganda can serve conflicting agendas. While the UK military 
wanted to create an intensely threatening media campaign to unsettle the Iraqi regime before 
the invasion of 2003, Alastair Campbell, Blair’s Director of Communications, felt compelled 
to tone down images of armed belligerence for political reasons, not least mass opposition in 
the UK to the war. As the MoD Director of Media Operations recalled, ‘it was as though we 
went to war pretending we weren’t’. Similarly, when the US military wanted to prepare the 
media to mislead the enemy in Fallujah they were wrongly led to report that the assault had 
already begun, forcing Washington to deny the story.  
This is compounded by the fact that with cyberspace propaganda cannot be restricted to a 
domestic audience. Domestic media has been integrated into global media. For instance, a 
message in the UK about ‘bringing our troops home’ may be understood by Afghanistan 
media as a cut and run story of abandonment. Media effects are therefore a more pressing 
priority for state propaganda than assumptions about a clearly defined target audience. 
Surrogates are used by intelligence to covertly plant stories with a third party leaving the real 
source of the story hidden, and free to confirm or deny it as required on a non-attributable 
basis. As one interviewee described the symbiotic relationship between journalists and the 
military: ‘they need us for access, we need them to tell our story’.  
Excessive levels and systems of codification and classification also impeded UK-US 
propaganda planning coordination. On the other hand, as the Snowden leaks show, US 
intelligence benefits from looser legal restrictions on information gathering in the UK. British 
intelligence is not simply a subordinate arm of US policy but is also able to exert relative 
autonomy as the occasion demands, as when it distanced itself publicly from the CIA 
following public exposure of US torture in Iraq. 
 Propaganda targets 
Loosely-affiliated terrorist networks present a more elusive and diffuse enemy for 
propaganda than the bi-polar state system of the Cold War. Rhetoric about a ‘war on terror’ 
supports an asymmetrical, open-ended and unlimited campaign compared to the binary logic 
of geo-political competition between Washington and Moscow. Yet it was other states – 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya - and their leaders – Taliban, Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi - that 
provided the initial opportunities for warfare. Indeed, the US pursuit of Saddam Hussein for 
propaganda purposes seemed to British informants a diversion from the very real threat of 
armed insurgency.  
State-directed propaganda can no longer take as self-evident the traditional boundaries of 
territorially demarcated enemy states. However, this more ‘flexible’ and reactive environment 
did not decentralise the propaganda effort but actively recruited civil society organisations 
into the ambit of military necessity. Similarly, the hopes of digital utopians for a democratic 
and egalitarian cyberspace have been dashed by covert propaganda operations that constantly 
call into question the reliability and authenticity of information.  
Yet media planning relies on a shared belief in the integrity and veracity of public agencies. 
When it came to the notorious ‘dodgy dossier’ that was compiled to justify the invasion of 
Iraq media planners placed their trust in ‘the system to get it right’. It seemed inconceivable 
to insiders that in all conscience ‘the intelligence community’ might be wrong or misguided 
about the situation in pre-war Iraq.  
A large hierarchical system imposes a perceptual consensus that disciplines the apparatus and 
prevents ideological dissensus. Hence the CIA ‘cherry picked’ politically popular ideas about 
Iraq for the propaganda war no matter how wide of the mark the information was, leading to 
Colin Powell’s public but false claims about Iraq’s chemical weapons at the UN in 2003. 
Propaganda faces a tougher environment when political leaders like Bush and Blair are seen 
as dissemblers that can no longer be trusted to tell the truth to the public they represent. It 
also makes it harder to accept the paternalist apology that elite propaganda is necessary to 
preserve democracy. Publics continue to be distrusted by politicians and intelligence bodies 
as ignorant and unstable subjects whose interests need to be managed by elites for their own 
good. 
As a specific type of knowledge reproduction propaganda is rightly assigned as ‘a very 
specific kind of communication’. Briant initially defined it as deliberate manipulation to 
produce a desired effect in the audience, a definition so broad that it would appear to 
encompass the production of all media texts. What is implicit here and specific to propaganda 
is a conscious attempt to conceal the relations of ruling. An entire apparatus is needed to 
produce desired effects across a wide population all the while concealing the motives of state 
and the leakiness of its own operation.  
 
Refugees and the media 
Successful propaganda eliminates, controls or marginalises competing perspectives and 
sources of information. The result is a monological media environment that serves powerful 
interests. This has been an abiding concern of the pioneering Glasgow Media Group over the 
past forty years. As the Glasgow Media Group, Emma Briant, Greg Philo and Pauline Donald 
examine in Bad News for Refugees recent media coverage of asylum and migration in the 
UK. Media coverage has been overwhelmingly monological, uniformly couched in negative 
discourses of deviancy, danger and disloyalty.  
Bad News show how certain underlying themes that conflate asylum-seekers with ‘economic’ 
migrants recursively structure news stories. In so doing the Glasgow Media Group adopt a 
richly-layered multi-method approach, deploying qualitative and quantitative textual analysis 
of press and television samples, audience research, and interviews with journalists, refugees 
and professionals. Negative themes about the asylum ‘threat’ became so embedded in the 
collective memory that focus groups were able to reproduce news headlines from 2006 
almost exactly word for word years later. 
Over the past two decades political rhetoric in the UK about asylum has coarsened as asylum 
policies become more and more draconian. Repeated references are made in the British press 
to ‘illegal asylum-seekers’ or ‘illegal immigrants’ even though no such legal categories exist. 
Following the catastrophic displacement of tens of millions of people in the aftermath of 
world war in 1951 the UN introduced basic protection for groups fleeing persecution. Under 
this provision ‘refugees’ are afforded greater protection than ‘asylum seekers’, people who 
have not yet firmly established the grounds for their persecution. This is compounded for 
other people who have no legal protection, above all those fleeing natural and human-made 
disasters, with few if any survival resources at their disposal, their precarious existence 
exacerbated by gross global economic and political power imbalances.  
This process of asylum demonisation coincided with a defensive and reactive New Labour 
government that shared an ideological consensus about ‘abuse’ of the welfare system by 
unscrupulous and undeserving asylum applicants, accompanied by heightened discourses of 
criminality and terrorism. It reached a farcical level with the Sun’s notorious front page 
headline of July 2003 that blared: ‘Callous asylum seekers are barbecuing the Queen’s 
swans’. Politicians outbid each other to criminalise asylum seekers in an arbitrary race to 
raise the absolute numbers of expelled refugees and reduce the absolute number of applicants. 
Such discourses rarely rate a mention of the obvious fact that a large proportion of displaced 
refugees are created by war, including British and US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Inaccurate media coverage about asylum is not the result of a few misinformed ideologues 
but, as Bad News amply demonstrates, is reproduced systematically in a way that glides 
effortlessly over any moral, factual and logical inconsistencies. Media, government, the 
police and immigration officials appear to have a mutual interest of colluding in stoking 
popular fear of migrants. Journalists find themselves under professional pressure to adapt 
stories to the preferred editorial narrative of dissolute and dangerous outsiders. Careers are on 
the line. One journalist revealed in a research interview that as a young reporter they were 
sent by a more powerful editor to ‘monster an asylum seeker’. This book is an accessible 
account of the process by which ‘monsters’ are invented and reproduced, and the nefarious 
consequences. 
Far from being an invasive threat to a tranquil UK, the ‘bogus’ asylum discourse has had real 
effects on the physical and mental well-being of refugees in the form of assaults, destitution, 
detention, and death. Interviewed refugees report that they feel vulnerable and stigmatised by 
news stories about criminal migrants that label them under a reviled category of human 
being. Distorted media representations fuel the informal circuits of blame gossip. As the Bad 
News team conclude, by constructing and legitimising public resentment media constructions 
of ‘asylum seekers may join a long list of convenient scapegoats including the unemployed, 
those claiming benefits and those registered as disabled’. Like other disdained groups, 
migrants also lack a presence in the media landscape as authors of their own narratives of 
displacement. 
Such misrepresentations are not merely false but inflammatory towards a desperately 
vulnerable group. To redress this imbalance less partial and more accurate reporting is 
necessary. This needs to be part of a wider politics of representation that addresses the 
shifting power balances between groups in society. Both Bad News and Briant’s searching 
study of propaganda help expose the processes and sources of misinformation in a turbulent 
world to the much needed interrogation of the democratic gaze. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Under review: G. Philo, E. Briant and P. Donald, Bad News for Refugees, Pluto Press, 2013; E.L. 
Briant, Propaganda and Counter-Terrorism: Strategies for Global Change, Manchester University 
Press, 2015. 
 
